Introduction
A lthough consent for orthopaedic surgery is commonly obtained by physician assistants (PAs), a recent court ruling in Pennsylvania suggests that these consents may not be valid. In Shinal v Toms [11] , the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled that the duty to get informed consent cannot be delegated by the physician. As a result, physicians practicing in Pennsylvania are legally required to adopt and discharge the duty of informed consent exclusively, without delegation to other healthcare providers such as PAs, advanced nurse practitioners, or residents.
As a state Supreme Court interpretation of a legislative statute, the Shinal decision is authoritative and binding in Pennsylvania, and will be applied as substantive law by federal courts located in that state. While a handful of other state rulings have suggested that informed consent is the exclusive duty of the physician [10] , to our knowledge, no other state or federal court has yet confronted the question of whether or not a physician can delegate the duty of informed consent to another professional as directly as the Shinal decision.
Court Rulings
In Shinal v Toms [11] , Ms. Shinal underwent surgery for recurrent craniopharyngioma, a brain tumor. Dr. Steven Toms, a Pennsylvania neurosurgeon, testified that the he met the patient and they considered total versus subtotal tumor resection. During the visit, he explained to Ms. Shinal that although subtotal tumor resection was a less risky surgery, it carried a higher chance of recurrence. Total resection offered better odds of long-term survival but risked damaging the adjacent optic nerve and carotid artery. The discussion did not yield a firm decision on the surgical approach.
Later, Ms. Shinal talked to Dr. Toms' PA on the telephone about the operation, discussing additional details such as scarring, likelihood of needing radiation, and incision placement. No firm decision was made during this call. Still later, when Ms. Shinal saw the PA for a history and physical examination, she signed an informed consent form. The consent form represented that Ms. Shinal had discussed the advantages and disadvantages of alternative treatments.
During craniotomy and total resection of the tumor, the carotid artery was injured, resulting in hemorrhage, stroke, brain injury, and partial blindness. In the ensuing medical negligence lawsuit, Ms. Shinal and her husband faulted Dr. Toms for failing to fully explain the lower-risk option of subtotal tumor resection followed by radiation. After some procedural issues were resolved, the litigation proceeded to jury trial to address the sole question of whether Dr. is informed if the patient has been given a description of a procedure set forth in subsection (a) and the risks and alternatives that a reasonably prudent patient would require to make an informed decision as to that procedure. The physician shall be entitled to present evidence of the description of that procedure and those risks and alternatives that a physician acting in accordance with accepted medical standards of medical practice would provide [8] .
Dr. Toms argued that while the duty to obtain informed consent was his, the law did not require him to supply all of the information personally. According to Dr. Toms, it is the information conveyed, rather than the person conveying it that determines informed consent.
Court Decision
In its June 2017 opinion, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed lower court rulings and held that the duty to obtain informed consent cannot be delegated by the surgeon. In the opinion, the court remarked: "A regime that would countenance delegation of the informed consent process would undermine the primacy of the physicianpatient relationship. Only by personally satisfying the duty of disclosure may the physician ensure that consent truly is informed" [11] .
The Shinal decision overruled earlier Pennsylvania court decisions that had permitted delegation of the informed consent process to other members of the medical team. In a 1983 ruling, Bulman v Myers, the courts rejected a claim that "a patient cannot formulate a valid, informed consent to a surgical procedure when disclosures of the risks of surgery are made by a nurse assistant and not by the operating surgeon" [1] . Another court, in Foflygen v Allegheny General Hospital, had clarified that informed consent "depends upon the pretreatment information relayed to the patient, regardless of whether the disclosures are made by the treating physician or another qualified person such as a nurse or other assistant" [4] .
In contrast to the above views, the Shinal court invoked its earlier decision in Valles v Albert Einstein Medical Center [14] . In that decision, the court found that a violation of the exclusive duty of the physician to obtain informed consent does not automatically implicate a hospital or physician employer. The Shinal court extended Valles further, to mean that the duty to obtain informed consent could not be delegated or shared by anyone else on the physician's team.
Analysis
Shinal was a 4-to-3 split decision that attracted controversy. The Litigation Center of the American Medical Association, and the Pennsylvania Medical Society filed a brief [9] supporting Dr. Toms, stating that he met MCARE Act obligations, and Pennsylvania common law precedents. The brief argued that both MCARE and common law had focused on what information was provided to the patient, rather than who provided it.
Dissenting Justice Max Baer expressed his concern that "for fear of legal liability, physicians now must be involved with every aspect of informing their patients' consent, thus delaying seriously ill patients' access to physicians and the critical services that they provide. Courts should not impose such unnecessary burdens upon an already strained and overwhelmed occupation when the law does not clearly warrant this judicial interference" [11] .
The Shinal court reasoned that the physician is best placed to provide informed consent because he or she is in the best position to know about the patient's medical history. In a commentary, legal scholar Valerie Koch JD noted that the court's emphasis on the sanctity of the physician-patient relationship may reflect a judicial desire to encourage continuing physician involvement in the face of a changing medical landscape with the introduction of technology, third parties (hospitals and insurance companies), and increasing interaction with a number of different specialists for an episode of care [6] .
Conclusions
The Shinal court opinion is clear that "a physician may not delegate to others his or her obligation to provide sufficient information in order to obtain a patient's informed consent" [11] . The court reasoned that Dr. Toms admitted as much in his own testimony: "Truly, we're not have to hear it, I have to know it" [11] . In our view, the clarity of this language invalidates informed consent discussions with anyone other than the physician performing the medical intervention. The earlier court ruling in Valles had shielded a hospital from vicarious liability for an employee-physician violating the duty to obtain informed consent. Taken together, the Valles and Shinal rulings strongly suggest that a physician may not delegate informed consent to anyone, ie, nonphysicians, as well as nonattending physicians, such as residents and fellows. In our view, the reliance of the Shinal court on the Valles decision is flawed. In Valles, a patient with diabetes suffered injury from a contrast dye use in an aortogram and claimed a lack of information about the risks associated with the dye or the possible alternatives. The court refused to extend vicarious liability to the hospital, reasoning that it did not want to disrupt the patientphysician relationship by introducing an element of control by the hospital [14] . Other state courts have similarly refused to hold employers and hospitals liable for informed consent claims. However, this judicial policy against imposing hospital liability for informed consent is inconsistent with modern clinical practice in which hospitals do, in fact, exert considerable control over the informed consent process [5] . As one example, the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs has implemented iMedConsent, a software that requires clinicians to manage the informed consent electronically to improve the quality of treatment disclosures at its medical centers [13] .
We believe that as long as a physician has authority over a PA's actions, the consent process remains a product of the physician-patient relationship [6] . Informed consent goes beyond a recitation of information, to a dynamic process that entails facilitating patient comprehension, answering questions, data-gathering, and weighing available options, toward the goal of arriving at a treatment decision. During this process, a patient may encounter PAs, nurse specialists, students, fellows, residents, and other professionals. Limiting informed consent to the physician may restrict full disclosure and open discussion in a healthcare environment with intense time pressure, and with patients already armed with information from the Internet and other resources.
We also believe that the Shinal decision is contrary to a holistic, teambased approach to medical care, where information disclosure facilitates a shared decision-making model. Studies have shown that patient counseling and the use of decision aids by healthcare professionals can improve patient understanding, while increasing satisfaction and empowerment [3, 7, 12] . Nurse specialists, for example, can increase patient understanding of medical procedures, and advocate on behalf of patients who express doubt or uncertainty about a procedure [2] .
But that is merely our analysis. At least in Pennsylvania, until it is overturned, the Shinal ruling requires physicians to execute the duty of informed consent themselves, and not delegate this duty to residents, PAs, advanced nurse practitioners, or another healthcare provider. To our knowledge, no other state or federal court has yet confronted the question of whether or not a physician can delegate the duty of informed consent to another professional. If courts in other states adopt the reasoning of Shinal when adjudicating similar claims in their jurisdictions, then informed consent will likely be restricted to the physician exclusively.
